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Reversing Obama’s 
Cuba Policy?*
William LeoGrande
In the two years after President Barack Obama and Cuban President 
Raúl Castro agreed to normalize relations, Obama tried to make his 
policy of engagement “irreversible” by opening up travel and trade 
that would create constituencies with a self-interest in defending 
engagement. He half-way succeeded. Despite the incendiary rhetoric 
in which Donald Trump cloaked his new policy when he rolled it out 
at a rally of Cuban-American hardliners in Miami, the sanctions he 
announced were limited.
•  Obama granted general licenses for all 12 categories of legal travel 
and relaxed other restrictions on who could visit Cuba. Trump 
rolled back only individualized people-to-people educational 
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 travel, so people-to-people visitors must once again travel on 
organized tours. But they can still go, and bring back rum and 
cigars.
•  Obama opened the Cuban market to U.S. businesses by licensing 
contracts with state enterprises in the travel, telecommunica-
tions, pharmaceuticals, construction, agriculture, and consumer 
goods sectors. Trump prohibited only contracts with Cuban en-
terprises managed by the military, and even then he exempted all 
existing contracts, and future contracts involving ports, airports, 
and telecomm – the sectors in which all but a handful of current 
U.S. businesses operate.
•  Trump did not impose any restrictions on Cuban–American 
family travel and remittances. He did not break diplomatic rela-
tions or put Cuba back on the State Department’s terrorism list. 
He did not restore the wet foot/dry foot policy that gave Cuban 
immigrants preferential treatment after reaching the United 
States. He did not abrogate the bilateral agreements on issues 
of mutual interest negotiated by the Obama administration.
Why such a flaccid set of sanctions from a president who stood 
on the stage in Little Havana and demonized the Cuban regime 
as brutal, criminal, depraved, oppressive, murderous, and guilty of 
“supporting human trafficking, forced labor, and exploitation all 
around the globe”?
•  Because Obama’s strategy of creating constituencies in favor 
of engagement worked. In the weeks leading up to Trump’s an-
nouncement, he was deluged with appeals not to retreat from 
engagement. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce argued in favor of 
expanding business opportunities, not constricting them. Farmers 
argued for expanding agricultural sales. Travel providers argued 
for expanding travel. Fifty-five U.S. Senators cosponsored a bill to 
lift all travel restrictions. Seven Republican members of Congress 
and 16 retired senior military officers argued that disengagement 
would damage national security by boosting Russian and Chinese 
influence on the island. Polling data showed that large majorities 
of the public, of Republicans, and even of Cuban Americans 
support engagement.
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•  Even the executive bureaucracy was won over by the successes 
scored by the policy of engagement. During the last two years 
of Obama’s presidency, Cuba and the United States signed 23 
bilateral agreements. When Trump ordered an inter-agency re-
view of Cuba policy, the consensus of the agencies involved was 
that engagement was working and ought to be continued. Trump 
rejected that conclusion because it did not fit with his political 
strategy of currying favor with the Cuban-American right, but the 
agencies fought back successfully against more extreme proposals 
to roll back Obama’s policies entirely.
Trump’s vicious rhetoric and his open embrace of the goal of regime 
change –through sanctions, support for dissidents, and “democracy 
promotion”– risks destroying the atmosphere of mutual respect and 
good faith that made the gains of Obama’s policy possible. Already, 
hardliners in Havana who saw engagement as a Trojan Horse for sub-
version are saying, “We told you so!” Cuba’s private entrepreneurs, 
who Trump’s policy purportedly aims to help, will be hurt the most 
by the prohibition on individual people-to-people travel. However, the 
overall economic impact of his sanctions will be limited, both on U.S. 
businesses and in Cuba.
•  Cuba’s official response has been pragmatic but firm. A statement 
released shortly after Trump’s Miami speech declared, “The Go-
vernment of Cuba reiterates its willingness to continue respectful 
dialogue and cooperation on issues of mutual interest, as well as 
the negotiation of pending bilateral issues with the United States 
Government.... But it should not be expected that Cuba will make 
concessions inherent to its sovereignty and independence, nor 
will it accept any kind of conditionality.”
In all likelihood, political pressures from the constituencies Obama’s 
policy created will continue to constrain Trump’s impulse to beat up 
on Cuba, but his loyalty to the exile right and his penchant for bullying 
will make it impossible to realize further progress toward normalizing 
relations. That will have to wait until the White House has a new 
occupant motivated by the national interest rather than by a political 
IOU given to Miami’s most recalcitrant Cuban-American minority.
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